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Legitimacy and Constraint: 
The Failure of  Multilateralism in SEATO
Syrus Jin
Mentor: Elizabeth Borgwardt
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was one of several multilateral 
alliances built by the United States in the early Cold War. However, SEATO never 
became an effective alliance because it lacked the foundations for strong multilateralism. 
This work uses international relations theory as a starting point to evaluate SEATO’s 
failings, and delineates the relationship between postcolonialism, American identity, and 
the flaws of American Cold War strategy in Asia to SEATO’s ineffectiveness. American 
strategic and identity concerns invariably inhibited the benefits which SEATO could 
deliver for its members. The need for the United States to maintain its policy autonomy 
trumped any interest in empowering the organization. SEATO was tainted by the legacy 
of colonialism, and its small membership was unable to form a cohesive base that could 
either balance the United States or deliver collective goods to its members. By design, 
SEATO’s constraints, and its legitimacy as a multilateral institution, were limited, 
preventing it from being effective in its own right or valuable as a legitimizing tool for 
American interventionism. Explaining SEATO through these lens in turns explains the 
contours of future U.S. policy in Asia in the Cold War and beyond, and the difficulties 
which policymakers face in attempting to build a legitimate multilateral institution.
